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CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT RESEARCH 
REGULATION: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FEDERAL 
AND LOCAL CONTROL 
RuthAnn Sherman* 
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our 
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would 
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of 
the several states. For one in my place sees how often a local policy 
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how 
often action is taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was 
meant to end. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes l 
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conse-
quences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal 
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve 
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country. 
Justice Louis Brandeis2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
"In no future war will the military be able to ignore poison gas. 
It is a higher form of killing."3 The prophecy of Fritz Haber, chemist, 
Nobel Prize winner, and pioneer of gas warfare, came true. Poison 
gas and other chemical warfare agents have not been ignored by the 
* Executive Editor, 1986-87, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
1 O. W. Holmes, Law and the Court, in Collected Legal Papers 291, 295-96 (1920) quoted 
in Pierce, Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to 
Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 607, 609 (1985). 
2 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) quoted 
in Pierce, supra note 1, at 609. 
a R. HARRIS & J. PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING: THE SECRET STORY OF CHEMICAL 
AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE (1982) at iii. 
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military. Toxic chemical and biological weapons have been developed 
for warfare in the twentieth century and may become more common 
in the future. 4 In the modern era, chemical warfare agents are a 
component of military planning and spending, whether efforts are 
focused on the development of new chemical weapons or on the 
detoxification of existing stockpiles of obsolete chemical weapons. 5 
In the 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act,6 the Armed 
Services Committee declared its support and approval for the pro-
duction of new binary chemical weapons. 7 These weapons are safer 
than earlier chemical weapons because the agents are separated in 
two compartments and only combine enroute to a target. The Act 
stated that "[i]t is the sense of Congress that existing unitary chem-
ical munitions currently stored in the United States and in European 
member nations of NATO should be replaced by modern, safer bi-
nary chemical munitions."s Thus, the path is clear toward renewed 
production of chemical weapons for the first time since 1969. 
Despite their importance and their hazards, it is unclear who, 
under current federal law, will regulate chemical warfare agent re-
search. While the Department of the Army is soliciting private 
contractors to conduct research on chemical warfare agents,9 the 
legal question of who controls these activities is largely unanswered. 
At least one municipality has given the Army its response. In Arthur 
D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health and Hospitals of Cam-
bridge,1O the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the au-
4 See R. CLARKE, THE SILENT WEAPONS (1968); S. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
WARFARE: AMERICA'S HIDDEN ARSENAL (1968); S. SEAGRAVE, YELLOW RAIN: A JOURNEY 
THROUGH THE TERROR OF CHEMICAL WARFARE (1981); S. MURPHY, A. HAY, & S. ROSE, 
No FIRE, No THUNDER: THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (1984). 
5 The Bidding to Make Poison Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1985 at F4, col. 1. 
• Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 583 (1986). 
7 H.R. REP. No. 99-81, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 472, 481. 
8 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 99-145, § 1411(d), 99 Stat. 583, 
746 (1986). 
9 Throughout the early 1980's, Congressional appropriations have steadily increased to 
support the development of a new generation of chemical warfare agents-the binary weapons. 
N.Y. TIMES, supra note 5, at F4; S. MURPHY, A. HAY, & S. ROSE, supra note 4, at 1. The 
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986 approved the Department of Defense 
request of $1,236 million for chemical modernization. See supra note 6, at 480. 
Binary chemical weapons are equivalent to the current forms of chemical weapons in terms 
of military effectiveness. They are, however, much safer to handle, transport, dispose of, and 
store. They contain two relatively safe chemical components in separate compartments which 
combine enroute to a target to form the same lethal agents found in existing chemical weapons. 
Parks, Classification ajChemical-Biological Wa'/fare, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (1982). 
10 395 Mass. 535,481 N.E.2d 441 (1985) [hereinafter ADL]. 
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thority of the City of Cambridge to halt chemical warfare agent 
research conducted by Arthur D. Little (ADL) and to prohibit all 
future chemical warfare agent-related business within the City's 
borders. This contest pits the municipality's police powers over 
health and safety issues against the federal government's preemptive 
powers over national defense-a conflict at the core of the federal 
system. 
This Comment addresses two issues raised by the ADL decision: 
(1) the narrow question of who regulates chemical warfare agent 
research activities; and (2) the broader question of what roles local 
and federal government should play in the regulatory system. As 
general background to the area, the Comment will first discuss 
chemical warfare agents' physical properties, and the potential en-
vironmental impact of these agents. The Comment will then explore 
the judicial preference for according local authorities flexibility to 
regulate the use of various toxic substances within their borders. 
This preference is based on a strict interpretation of the preemption 
doctrine. In order to determine how the courts will treat local reg-
ulation of chemical warfare agents, this Comment will examine the 
evolution of the preemption doctrine, as well as recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions that apply the preemption standards. In 
addition, the preemption issue of the ADL case will be examined in 
detail. The ADL litigation is an example of extreme judicial defer-
ence given to local chemical warfare agent research regulation. The 
discussion of the decision will reveal how local regulation of these 
agents may be preempted, but why it is not. As the decision in ADL 
demonstrates, under the current state of preemption analysis, a 
locality could impose an unlimited ban on chemical warfare agents if 
it chose to do so. This Comment concludes that such a possibility 
should not be realized. Rather, a compromise should be attempted 
that will accommodate the need for local control and the probability 
that some chemical warfare agent experimentation and detoxification 
programs will be located near populated areas. 
II. THE DANGERS OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS 
Chemical warfare agents are highly toxic substances that are de-
signed to be quickly dispersed in order to disable and/or kill great 
numbers of people. 11 At present, these agents are largely unregu-
11 Cambridge Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) Report to the City Manager (September, 
1984) at 2 (available from the Cambridge Commissioner of Health & Hospitals) [hereinafter 
SAC Report]. 
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lated by local, state, or federal statutes. 12 The danger chemical war-
fare agents pose necessitates a regulatory scheme satisfying both 
local and national concerns. 
A. Toxicological and Physical Properties 
There are several different types of chemical warfare agents; their 
effects vary depending on the particular agent's potency and the 
dose received. Among the different chemical warfare agents in ex-
isting weapons stockpiles and those being tested for use in new 
weapons systems are nerve agents and blister agents such as those 
which the City of Cambridge banned from its borders. 13 The military 
categorizes these agents as "casualty agents." They are lethal in 
relatively small doses,14 and can enter the body by inhalation or 
absorption through the skin. 15 
The toxicity of chemical warfare agents is measured by dose 
level. 16 For example, the City of Cambridge considered the following 
dose levels in its determination of the dangers posed by chemical 
warfare agent research within the city limits: 
LD50 Adult (defined as the dose level at which 50% of exposed 
adults will die without immediate emergency medical care); 
LDol Adult (defined as the dose level at which 1% of exposed 
adults will die without immediate emergency medical care); 
LDOI Child (defined as the dose level at which 1% of exposed 
children will die without immediate emergency medical care).17 
Examination of the approximate LD50 dose levels indicates the 
highly toxic nature of these chemical warfare agents. IS For example, 
VX, the most toxic agent by inhalation, has an estimated LD50 dose 
level wherein about O.3mg (about 11100 of a drop) of VX is sufficient 
12 [d. at 15. 
18 The following chemical materials were to be used in research at the ADL laboratories 
and thus were prohibited by the City of Cambridge regulation: 1) Soman-GD (nerve agent), 
2) Sarin-GB (nerve agent), 3) VX (nerve agent), 4) Mustard-HD (blister agent), 5) Lewisite 
(blister agent). ADL, 395 Mass. at 538, n.2, 481 N.E.2d at 444, n.2. 
14 S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra note 4, at 111-12. 
16 M. Meselson & J. P. Robinson, Chemical Waifare and Chemical Disarmament, ScI AM, 
April 1980, at 39. 
16 SAC Report, supra note 11, at 5. 
17 "[t]hese values are only approximate. In any accident, the number of fatalities would 
depend on wind speed, direction, time of day, the nature of the accident, the amount of the 
agent vaporized, and the amount of the agent inhaled." [d. at 6. 
IB See SAC Report, supra note 11, at 6; S. MURPHY, A. HAY & S. ROSE, supra note 4, at 
112-13. 
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to kill 50% of the adults who inhale it directly.19 The LDOl adult 
lethal dose is about 1I7th this amount.20 A single drop of VX that 
directly touches an adult's skin will be lethal if left untreated for 
several minutes. 21 These chemical materials can thus be quite harm-
ful even if one is exposed to small amounts for a short period of time. 
Blister agents and nerve agents affect the human biologic system 
in different ways. For example, nerve agents (such as Soman-GD, 
Sarin-GB, and VX) work by inhibiting the enzyme acetylcholines-
terase (ACHE) which controls the body's muscle movements. 22 At 
synapses throughout the nervous system, the chemical acetylcholine 
activates the muscle or nerve cells and rapidly accumulates. Acetyl-
choline is normally decomposed by ACHE. Since nerve agents block 
production of ACHE, they prevent the body from stopping the ac-
tivation and movement of its muscles.23 The consequent buildup of 
acetylcholine at synapses in the nervous system produces the follow-
ing symptoms: intense sweating, filling of the bronchial passages 
with mucus, bronchial constriction, dimming and loss of vision, un-
controllable vomiting, loss of bowel control, convulsions, paralysis, 
and, if the dose level was lethal, death by asphyxia and respiratory 
failure. 24 The inhibiting effect of the nerve agents actually causes 
the body to "strangle in its own vital organs."25 While they are also 
highly toxic, blister agents such as mustard-HD and lewisite cause 
irritations and burns.26 Moreover, greater quantities of blister agents 
are usually necessary to produce the same effect as a smaller amount 
of nerve agents. 27 
19 SAC Report, supra note 11, at 6. 
00 [d. 
21 [d. 
22 S. HERSH, supra note 4, at 45; M. Meselson & J. P. Robinson, supra note 15, at 39. 
?:d [d. 
24 [d. 
26 S. HERSH, supra note 4, at 45. 
26 The Army training manual, Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents describes the 
effects of one type of blister agent: 
Mustard acts first as a cell irritant and finally as a cell poison on all tissue surfaces 
contacted. The first symptoms of HD poisoning usually appear in from four to six 
hours; the higher the concentration, the shorter the interval between the exposure 
to the agent and the first symptoms. The local action results in conjunctivitis or 
inflammation of the eyes; erythema (redness of the skin) which may be followed by 
blistering or ulceration; and inflammation of the nose, throat, trachea, bronchi and 
lung tissue. 
. . . Injuries produced by HD heal much more slowly and are more liable to infection 
than burns of similar intensity produced by physical means or by other chemicals. 
[d. at 47-48. 
~ [d. 
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B. Environmental and Health Effects of Chemical Waifare 
Agents 
Due to their extreme toxicity, the production and storage of chem-
ical warfare agents present environmental and health hazards of an 
immediate and potentially catastrophic nature to local populations. 28 
Despite stringent Army safety requirements,29 accidents involving 
the release of chemical warfare agents have occurred in the past30 
and may occur in the future as the stockpiles of obsolete chemical 
weapons continue to deteriorate causing leaks of the chemical 
agents. 31 As the military pursues its goals of updating its chemical 
warfare arsenal and disposing of the outdated arsenal, the potential 
hazards increase. 
These stockpiles of chemical weapons currently are stored at sev-
erallocations around the nation: Tooele Army Depot/Dugway Prov-
ing Ground, Tooele, Utah; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas; 
Umatilla Army Depot, Hermiston, Oregon; Anniston Army Depot, 
Anniston, Alabama; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, Newport, 
Indiana; Pueblo Army Depot, Pueblo, Colorado; Johnston Island, 
Pacific Ocean; Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, Maryland; Blue Grass 
Army Depot, Lexington, Kentucky; and Rocky Mountain Arsenal, 
Denver, Colorado.32 The location of these munitions may present 
28 See Wolfe, Chemical and Biological Waif are: Medical Effects and Consequences, 28 
MCGILL L.J. 732, 748 (1983) wherein the author compares the medical effects of a nuclear 
bomb explosion on the test population to the effects of a nerve gas release on the same test 
group. 
29 See infra notes 195-213 and accompanying text. 
30 S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 4, at 258-76. 
81 Disposal of Chemical Weapons Seen Costing Pentagon Billions, The Washington Post, 
March 15, 1981, at AS, col. 1. 
32 According to one source, the total estimate of chemical warfare agents stored in bulk 
containers or in munitions is roughly 40,000 tons. The inventory is broken down at the following 
locations: 1) Tooele Army DepotlDugway Proving Ground, Tooele, Utah; 39-43% of total 
stocks; nerve and mustard gas, including almost every type of filled munition (H, HD, HT, 
GB, or VX) currently operational; eight 1I2-mile rows of one ton bulk storage containers 
reported; 2) Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Arkansas; 12-13% of total stocks; nerve and 
mustard gas, some or all of the latter in one ton bulk storage containers; 3) Umatilla Army 
Depot, Hermiston, Oregon; 12-13% of total stocks; nerve and probably mustard gas, some in 
bulk storage containers; 4) Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama; 9-10% of total stocks; 
nerve and mustard gas, some or all of the latter in bulk storage containers; 5) Newport Army 
Ammunition Plant, Newport, Indiana; 3-6% of total stocks; VX only; 6) Pueblo Army Depot, 
Pueblo, Colorado; 3-6% of total stocks; mustard gas only; 7) Johnston Island, Pacific Ocean; 
3-6% of total stocks; VX, GB, and mustard gas; 8) Edgewood Arsenal, Edgewood, Maryland; 
3-5% of total stocks; mustard gas only, some or all in bulk storage containers; 9) Blue Grass 
Army Depot, Lexington, Kentucky; 1% of total stocks; nerve and perhaps mustard gas; 10) 
Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver, Colorado; less than 1% of total stocks; GB and VX agents. 
J. P. Perry Robinson, Chemical Waifare Capabilities of the Warsaw and North Atlantic 
Treaty Organizations: An Overview from Open Sources in STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL 
1986] CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENT RESEARCH 137 
dangers to adjacent populations.33 For example, the Rocky Mountain 
Arsenal, which stores 4.2 million pounds of Saren-GB nerve gas, as 
well as bombs filled with the nerve agent VX, is located on the edge 
of Denver's International Airport, only ten miles from the City 
itself.34 The proximity of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to the airport 
raises the possibility of an airplane crash that could affect the safety 
of the chemical storage depot. 35 
In 1968, an incident occurred at the Dugway Proving Ground near 
Salt Lake City, Utah, where 6,300 sheep died when a cloud of VX 
nerve agent was accidently released.36 During one of the Army's 
ongoing nerve gas tests and demonstrations, an aircraft's tanks con-
taining the gas failed to close properly. As the plane ascended, the 
nerve agent dispersed, killing the sheep.37 Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe, 
head of the state's investigation into the deaths, said, "We're very 
lucky no people were killed."38 Another similar incident was reported 
in 1979 at the Army's Lexington Blue Grass Depot where 70,000 M-
55 nerve gas rockets are stored. 39 Forty-five residents of nearby 
Madison County, Kentucky were hospitalized after an accident at 
the facility released noxious fumes over the area. 40 
The detoxification of these outmoded, non-binary chemical muni-
tions is an important concern.41 In fact, the Army has identified 
certain "defective" nerve and blister gas weapons which have leaked 
in the past, causing "mild" symptoms for some people, but no deaths, 
or "known lasting effects. "42 A paper on the subject, prepared by a 
Pentagon transition team in 1981, stated: 
PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CHEMICAL WEAPONS: DESTRUCTION AND CONVERSION, at 38 
(1980). 
33 S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 4, at 4. An incident in August, 1972 on Johnston Island indicates 
that the poison gas stockpiles may be less than secure. At that time, the United States Air 
Force was forced to evacuate quickly all personnel because the island's chemical warfare depot 
was in the path of a hurricane. Such forms of natural disasters like hurricanes and earthquakes 
could cause an accidental release of the deadly chemical warfare gases. Id. 
34 Id. at 2. 
36 Id. at 4. In 1971, the residents of the Rocky Mountain arsenal area and nearby areas 
brought suit to challenge the storage of chemical warfare agents at that site. The Court 
dismissed the suit on the grounds that it was an unconsented suit against the United States. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the federal government exercises unfettered control over 
the operation of federal military establishments. McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 
1971) . 
.. Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996, 1002 (10th Cir. 1972). 
37Id. 
38 S. SEAGRAVE, supra note 4, at 259. 
39 Nerve Gas and Blue Grass, Newsweek, August 19, 1985, at 19. 
40 Id. 
41 See The Washington Post, supra note 31, at A5, col. 1. 
42 Id. 
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[t]he inherent risk involved in allowing the deterioration of the 
stockpile to continue without regard to the public and environ-
mental safety is unacceptable. Implementation of a total demi-
litarization program is required in the near term to begin elim-
ination of the potential hazard. 43 
In addition, the paper estimated that the "total stockpile demilitar-
ization" cost would be $3.7 billion.44 Congress demonstrated its con-
cern about the deterioration of current chemical warfare stocks in 
the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986.45 That law 
makes the final assembly of new binary chemical munitions depen-
dent on the implementation of a plan to destroy the stockpile of 
lethal, obsolete chemical weapons by September 30, 1994.46 
Military efforts to detoxify obsolete chemical weapons or to de-
velop new weapons will involve research, storage, transportation, 
and disposal of extremely toxic chemical warfare agents. 47 Whether 
this work is done on army bases or by private contractors, the health 
and safety of adjacent communities could be affected. Recognizing 
these potential dangers, Congress imposed several conditions on the 
continued development of new binary chemical weapons. For ex-
ample, the two components of these munitions must be stored in 
separate states and be transported separately in order to qualify for 
federal funding. 48 
The budgeting of Department of Defense funds for new chemical 
warfare agent research, development, and detoxification indicates 
national interest in this area. 49 The potential environmental and 
health hazards of chemical warfare agents mandate a cooperative 
regulatory scheme between the competing local and national con-
cerns. A cooperative effort is particularly necessary because the lack 
4S [d. 
44 [d. Note-this is a 1981 estimate and therefore the figure is probably higher today. 
45 See supra note 6, at § 1411(c)(2)(D). 
45 [d. 
47 In its preliminary environmental impact statement, the Army stated that on-site incin-
eration is its "preferred alternative" for destroying obsolete chemical agents stored throughout 
the United States. [Current Developments] 17 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 361 (July 4, 
1986). The incineration in containers designed to prevent the escape of gases is to begin in 
June 1989. [d. In preparing its preliminary impact statement, the Army considered four 
alternative methods of disposal: 
1) On-site disposal at existing storage installations; 
2) Transportation to regional disposal centers at two storage sites in Alabama and Utah; 
3) Transportation to one national disposal center in Utah; and 
4) No action/continued storage. 
[d. at 362. The Army's concern over possible accidents or terrorist attacks during transpor-
tation was the primary reason for the decision to burn on site. [d. 
48 See supra note 6, at § 1411(c)(4) and (c)(5). 
49 See supra note 6. 
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of clear federal control in the chemical warfare agent field raises the 
question of which governmental bodies possess the authority to reg-
ulate these agents. 50 
III. THE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Whether a locality can regulate chemical warfare agent research 
within its borders depends on the extent of congressional action in 
that field. When local and national interests collide, the question of 
which claim will predominate is resolved by examining federal reg-
ulation in that area. If a locality has advanced its interests at the 
expense of national interests, then either Congress or a federal 
agency with the delegated authority may preempt the local regula-
tion. 51 In order to understand the current regulatory scheme that 
affects chemical warfare agents, it is necessary to examine the 
preemption doctrine generally,52 to analyze the judicial solicitude for 
state and local interests in recent preemption decisions,53 and then 
to see the application of such considerations in the ADL litigation. 54 
60 There have been some international efforts to control chemical weapons. See Lawler, 
Progress Towards International Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 13 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 1220 (1982). For example, their use in war is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
to which all major nations have agreed. Id. Moreover, since 1976 the United States and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have had several negotiation sessions in Geneva aimed at 
chemical disarmament, including a ban on the development, production, and stockpiling of 
chemical weapons. Id. at 1236. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction (1972) already embodies these prohibitions against biological agents but not 
against chemical weapons. Id. at 1231. In addition, the United Nations General Assembly 
continues to recommend two resolutions on its agenda that call for an agreement to prohibit 
chemical weapons, and, pending that agreement, a moratorium on the further development, 
production, or stockpiling of chemical agents for weapons. Id. at 1235. The goal of chemical 
weapon disarmament remains an urgent one for the United Nations as reflected in the report 
by the ad hoc working group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament. Id. 
at 1242. The report stated that the objective of an international convention on chemical 
weapons was as follows: 
Each State Party to this Convention should undertake ... never.under any circum-
stances to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical 
weapons and to destroy or otherwise dispose of existing stocks of chemical weapons 
and means of production of such weapons. 
Id. at 1242, n. 64. As of this writing, there is no international accord prohibiting the devel-
opment, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons. 
51 For good discussions of administrative preemption, see Foote, Administrative Preemp-
tion: An Experiment in RegUlatory Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429 (1984); Pierce, supra 
note 1. 
52 For a general discussion and overview of the preemption doctrine, see J. NOWAK, R. 
ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, Constitutional Law 292-96 (2d ed. 1983). 
53 See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text. 
54 See infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Evolution of Preemption Analysis 
In its determination of which law to apply when there is a conflict 
between federal and local regulation, the United States Supreme 
Court is guided by the Constitutional provision that federal law is 
"the supreme Law of the Land."55 Throughout the nation's history, 
the Court has repeatedly been asked to determine whether federal 
and local laws in an area can coexist or whether the supremacy 
clause requires that local laws give way to national regulation. 56 
In its most recent decisions, the Court has refined its preemption 
analysis, the roots of which lie within the oft-cited language of Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator COrp.:57 
[t]he question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was. 
. . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The 
scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make 
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the 
States to supplement it. Or the Act of Congress may touch a 
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal 
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws 
on the same subject. [Or] the object sought to be obtained by 
the federal law and the character of obligation imposed by it may 
reveal the same purpose. Or the state policy may produce a 
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. 58 
In its efforts to answer the "perplexing question whether Congress 
has precluded state action"59 the Court has woven the tangled 
strands of preemption analysis into three more or less distinct cat-
egories:60 explicit or implicit federal occupation of the field,61 actual 
55 Article VI, § 2 of the United States Constitution provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding. 
56 See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 
440 (1960); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U.S. 52 (1941). 
57 331 U.S. 218 (1947). 
58 [d. at 230 (citations omitted). 
59 [d. 
60 See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,203-04 (1983). 
61 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (citing Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de 
la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
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conflicts with federal law,62 and obstacles to accomplishment of 
congressional goals. 63 
Congress can directly "occupy an entire field" to the exclusion of 
all state regulation. 64 It is rare, however, that Congress will pro-
nounce its express intention to do SO.65 In fact, congressional acts 
often include a "savings clause" authorizing concurrent state or local 
regulation. 66 The Court will thus conclude that Congress has 
preempted all state authority only if it finds either an explicit intent 
to do so or a federal regulatory scheme so pervasive that it demon-
strates an implicit congressional intent to occupy the field. 67 Indeed, 
the Court has stated that absent clear congressional intent to 
preempt a field, "[t]he exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly 
to be presumed."68 The Court must determine congressional intent 
by analyzing a federal statute's general operation and the relation-
ship between that operation and the state action at issue. 69 
Second, federal law will supplant any state or local regulation that 
directly conflicts with the federal regulatory requirements. 7o Even 
if Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a par-
ticular area, state law is still preempted to the extent that the Court 
finds an "actual conflict" with federal law-that is "when it is impos-
sible to comply with both state and federal law."71 
Finally, state or local regulatory action will be preempted when 
the state or local law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."72 To 
determine whether a local regulation frustrates the policies under-
lying a federal regulation the Court must consider the goals of the 
federal enactment and the effect of the local law on the federal 
government's ability to achieve those goals. For example, the pur-
pose of some federal regulation is to obtain uniform results, an 
62 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 
U.S. at 142-43). 
63 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204 (citing Hines, 312 U.S. at 67). Accord, DeCanas 
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976). 
64 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, at 292. 
66 [d. 
66 [d. 
67 See, e.g., Ray, 435 U.S. at 157; Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). 
68 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). 
69 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, at 293. 
70 Ray, 435 U.S. at 158. 
n Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43). 
72 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67 quoted in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204. 
142 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 14:131 
impossibility if the various states can supplement federal laws with 
their own requirements. 73 
The Court has thus formulated certain standards to analyze the 
competing claims of state and congressional supremacy. 74 Yet, as 
Justice Black cautioned in Hines, " ... none of these expressions 
provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional 
yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one crystal clear 
distinctly marked formula. "75 
Complicating the preemption analysis further is the deferential 
treatment accorded regulations that are an exercise of a state or 
locality's traditional police powers.76 The state's police powers in-
clude authority to enact legislation to protect the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the state's citizens. 77 The Court has defined the 
police power of a state as embracing "regulations designed to pro-
mote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as 
regulations designed to promote the public health, the public morals 
or the public safety. "78 Moreover, the Court has stated that when 
the state's exercise of its police power is challenged under the su-
premacy clause, " ... we start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the State[s] were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Con-
gress. "79 The purpose of Congress, however, is often neither "clear" 
nor "manifest." Since the burden of discovering congressional intent 
falls to the courts, it is instructive to analyze the current judicial 
concern for state interests in order to see the movement toward 
greater local control over areas involving federal regulation. 80 
73 See Ray, 435 U.S. at 163. Congress intended that national standards for design and 
construction of tankers be uniform which foreclosed the passage of different or more stringent 
state requirements. In the case of chemical warfare agents, federal action to control the 
decaying stockpile would eliminate the state-created dangers of disparate control and inspec-
tion and replace them with a uniform system. 
74 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, at 293. 
75 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
76 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 52, at 268-70. 
77 [d. 
78 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Illinois ex. reI. Drainage Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906); see 
also Huron Portland Cement Co., 362 U.S. at 442 (state or locality may, in the exercise of 
police power, act in the area of interstate commerce concurrently with the federal govern-
ment). 
79 Rice, 331 U.S. at 230; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 
2380, 2398 (1985), quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873) ("The States tradi-
tionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as 'to the protection of 
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."'). 
80 Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger 
Court, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 623, 639 (1975). 
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B. Current Preemption Analysis-A Solicitude for State Interests 
The Court under former Chief Justice Burger has generally fa-
vored concurrent state-federal regulation and has therefore been 
reluctant to find federal preemption of local regulations.81 In more 
and more decisions, the Court has incorporated into its preemption 
inquiry a concern for state and local interests. 82 Rather than com-
pletely invalidating the state law, the Court's approach is often an 
attempt to reconcile the operation of both the state and federal 
laws. 83 
One of the main reasons that the Court disfavors outright preemp-
tion is that a finding of no preemption leaves the door open to future 
congressional action.84 The Court hesitates to invalidate state and 
local legislation because the state is then powerless to change that 
decision. 85 On the other hand, the federal government can always 
enact further legislation to overrule a finding of no preemption.86 If 
the Court misinterprets the intent of Congress, the legislative 
branch may then use its power to correct the situation.87 In addition, 
the judicial solicitude for state and local interests also stems from a 
belief that the diffusion of regulatory power to the states furthers 
democracy.88 The current position of the Court therefore approaches 
a presumption against preemption based on these two factors: no 
81 Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 132 (1978) ("This Court is generally 
reluctant to infer preemption."); see also, Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 
1029, 1038 (1st Cir. 1982). 
82 In recent years, the Court has not found preemption of state laws that were challenged 
under the supremacy clause, even in areas with a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme. 
See, e.g., New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 
(1979) (state power to provide unemployment benefits for strikers is not preempted by National 
Labor Relations Act); DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 357--59 (state authority to regulate employment 
of illegal aliens is not preempted by Immigration and Nationality Act); New York State Dept. 
of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413-14 (1973) (state work programs for welfare 
recipients not preempted by Aid to Families With Dependent Children program); Goldstein 
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560-61, 571 (1973) (state copyright law is not preempted by 
Copyright Clause and federal statutes enacted thereunder). 
83 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) (Court upheld 
state law regarding employee pension benefits despite an actual conflict with federal securities 
law). 
84 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) quoting Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943). 
86 Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 686 F.2d at 1038. 
86 Id. 
87 Pierce, supra note 1, at 629. 
88 Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 686 F.2d at 1038. 
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preemption enables Congress to act without burdening the states, 
while it also affirms democratic values.89 
The Court's preference for upholding state and local regulations 
against supremacy clause challenges is evident in two recent deci-
sions involving nuclear power. Both Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. 
State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission90 
and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee COrp.91 dealt with challenges to state 
89 [d. 
90 461 U.S. 190 (1983). In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. the utility company raised a supremacy 
clause challenge to a California statute prohibiting construction of nuclear power plants until 
a state agency determined that adequate storage and disposal facilities existed for the nuclear 
waste material. [d. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) argued that the Atomic Energy 
Act preempted the state law. The stated purpose of the Atomic Energy Act is "to encourage 
widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful 
purposes to the maximum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with 
the health and safety of the public." Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982). 
In its interpretation of the Act, the Court concluded that Congress intended to divide the 
regulatory authority between federal and state control. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 
211-12. While the Act gave exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear safety matters to the Atomic 
Energy Commission, the states retained their traditional responsibility to regulate economic 
aspects of nuclear power. [d. The Court thus distinguished between a valid state moratorium 
based on "economic" concerns and an invalid state moratorium based on "safety" concerns. 
[d. at 213. The Court upheld the California statute because it was aimed at economic problems, 
for example, the possibility of higher electric rates if nuclear plants had to shutdown for lack 
of waste storage space. [d. at 213-14. The Court concluded that despite the congressional 
desire to develop nuclear power, states have "sufficient authority" to slow or even stop that 
development for "economic reasons." [d. at 223. 
91 464 U.S. 238 (1984). In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. the Court qualified the preemptive 
effect of federal law even further. Silkwood involved a determination of whether an award of 
punitive damages authorized by state law was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. [d. at 
241. The jury's award of $10,000,000 in punitive damages was based on a finding that Kerr-
McGee was "grossly negligent, reckless and wilful" in allowing plutonium to escape from its 
facility. [d. at 245. However, Kerr-McGee argued that its compliance with federal regulations 
under the Price-Anderson Act preempted the state's authority and precluded an award of 
punitive damages. [d. 
Kerr-McGee argued that the state law authorizing an award of punitive damages did not 
survive a supremacy clause challenge based on the three principles of preemption analysis-
the federal government had occupied the nuclear field, the state action actually conflicted with 
federal regulation, and the state action frustrated congressional purposes. [d. at 248. Consis-
tent with its recent decision in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court rejected all three arguments 
for preemption. 
The majority found that, while "the federal government has occupied the entire field of 
nuclear safety concerns," their occupation did not extend to preemption of state tort law. [d. 
at 249. The Court declined to hold state regulations that award punitive damages preempted 
because Congress was silent concerning the preemptive effect of the Act on traditional tort 
law. In fact, the Court found the congressional silence significant "in light of Congress' failure 
to provide any federal remedy" for those exposed to radiation in a nuclear plant. [d. at 251. 
The Court then rejected Kerr-McGee's second argument that state awards of punitive 
damages actually conflict with the NRC's authority "to impose civil penalties on licensees 
when federal standards have been violated." [d. at 257. It found no fatal conflict. "Paying 
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laws based on the preemptive authority of the Atomic Energy Act. 
In each case the Court rejected the preemption challenge and upheld 
the state law. 
Analyzed together, the Court's decisions in Pacific Gas & Electric 
and Silkwood evidence a judicial reluctance to find federal preemp-
tion of state regulation even in areas such as nuclear power where 
there is extensive federal involvement. 92 States and localities seem 
to be freer, in the eyes of the law, to regulate in ways that may 
conflict with national goals. As the decision in Pacific Gas & Electric 
demonstrates, it is possible for a state to regulate in an area and 
effectively frustrate a federal purpose. 93 The state need only express 
the rationale for its regulation in a manner different from the stated 
basis for federal involvement. 94 
Moreover, the Silkwood decision reveals that the Court may ad-
vance state or local regulations over federal statutes when there is 
a supremacy clause challenge. For example, the Silkwood Court 
would not hold a state regulatory action preempted even in an area 
"occupied by" federal law if the state operated through a traditionally 
available state method. Silkwood also suggests a reluctance by the 
Court to hold state regulatory action preempted unless the conflict 
with the federal scheme makes it literally impossible to comply with 
both regulatory requirements. 95 The Court thus rigorously applies 
its preemption analysis in a manner that favors state regulations. 96 
It seems, therefore, that unless Congress has shown its clear 
intention to preempt the particular form of state regulatory action, 
the Court will uphold the state action even if it affects national 
interests. As one state court explained, "[p ]reemption . . . is not 
favored, and State laws should be upheld unless a conflict with 
Federal law is clear. "97 
both federal fines and state-imposed punitive damages for the same incident would not appear 
to be physically impossible," the Court concluded. [d. 
Finally, the Court rejected Kerr-MeGee's contention that state punitive damages awards 
are preempted because they would frustrate the congressional purpose of furthering com-
mercial nuclear power development. Relying on their reasoning in Pacific Gas & Electric, the 
Court concluded, as it had in that earlier decision, that Congress did not intend to further 
"the promotion of nuclear power . . . 'at all costs. '" [d. 
92 See supra note 82. 
93 See supra note 90. 
94 [d. 
95 See supra note 91. 
96 [d. 
97 ADL, 395 Mass. at 545,481 N.E.2d at 448, quoting Attorney Gen. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 
385 Mass. 598, 602 (1982) (Travelers I), vacated, 103 S. Ct. 3563 (1983), reaffirmed, 391 Mass. 
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A court's preemption analysis in the field of chemical warfare 
agents should be conducted against the backdrop of these cases that 
favor concurrent state regulation against supremacy clause chal-
lenges. The ADL decision is an example of the federal preemption 
doctrine, applied in a state court context, to regulation of these 
agents. The case demonstrates how far local regulation may go in 
the absence of any federal regulatory impediment. A municipality 
may prohibit chemical warfare agents within its borders without its 
actions being preempted. These bans could then have an effect on 
future development and detoxification of chemical weapons. 
C. An Example of Preemption Analysis in the Chemical Waifare 
Agent Field: The ADL Case 
There is a federal regulatory vacuum concerning chemical warfare 
agents. The lack of a clear, effective federal presence in this area 
leaves the field open to complete regulatory control by state and 
local authorities pursuant to their police powers. Given the current 
Administration's continuing commitment to the development and, 
possibly, the production of new chemical weapons,98 the Department 
of Defense's preference for private chemical warfare agent re-
search,99 and the pressing concerns about detoxifying the deterio-
rating stockpiles of old chemical weapons,100 the existence of a strong 
national interest is clear. Similarly, as the research and testing of 
chemical warfare agents expands, communities where private de-
fense contractors are located, or that are near Army bases and 
arsenals, have a legitimate interest in how these agents are con-
trolled. 101 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently ended the 
competition between these interests when it held that the City of 
Cambridge's regulatory power was not preempted by any federal 
regulatory scheme. The court found that the City could legally ban 
the testing, storage, transportation, and disposal of chemical warfare 
agents within its borders.102 This case is the only one to date that 
addresses local regulation of these chemical agents. 
730 (1984), aff'd sub nom., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 105 S. Ct. 2380 
(1985). 
98 See supra note 9. 
99 See sup1"l1, note 5. 
100 See supra notes 41~7 and accompanying text. 
lOl See supra note 39. 
102 395 Mass. at 557, 481 N.E.2d at 455. 
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1. Factual Background 
The events that culminated in the Massachusetts decision began 
when a consulting firm, Arthur D. Little (ADL), signed a contract 
with the Department of Defense (DOD) on June 23, 1982.103 ADL 
contracted to test chemical warfare agents in order to increase the 
sensitivity of the Army's chemical agent detection methods used in 
their Water Testing KitS. 104 The contractual work was to be done 
with nerve agents, mustard agents, lewisite, and cyanide. l05 
In 1982, ADL made plans to renovate an existing laboratory in 
order to satisfy the DOD contractual specifications for handling 
chemical warfare agents. 106 Section H of the DOD contract entitled 
"Special Provisions" stipulated the safety and security measures to 
be taken. 107 The DOD also established detailed specifications for the 
construction of the buildings where the chemical warfare agents 
would be tested. One of these provisions stated that "the most secure 
facilities available be used for the ... storage of the chemicals. "lOB 
Ultimately, the safety burden associated with testing these agents 
rested on the private contractor, ADL. Section H(ll) of the contract 
provided that the contractor would be responsible for planning and 
safeguarding the detoxification and decontamination of the chemical 
agents furnished by the government. If a fire, explosion, or other 
accident occurred, it was the contractor's responsibility to have ad-
equate resources to respond to the emergency. The DOD contract 
specified that the private contractor could not rely on outside agen-
cies, such as local fire departments, for emergency capabilities. 109 In 
1983 ADL's Levins Laboratory was completed pursuant to this con-
tract and its safety provisions. 110 
2. The Local Regulatory Response 
Despite the numerous safety precautions mandated by the DOD 
contract, local political and citizen opposition to the activities at ADL 
103 All references to the ADL-DOD contract are found in: Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Com-
missioner of Health & Hospitals of Cambridge, Memorandum of Decision on Severed Issue, 
December 14, 1984, Superior Court, No. 84-1529 at 3. [hereinafter Memorandum on Severed 
Issue]. 
104 [d. 
106 [d. 
106 SAC Report, supra note 11, at B-1. 
107 Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 3. The required safety steps were 
extensive, including limitations on the length and width of researchers' sideburns. 
108 [d. at 4. 
109 [d. 
uo [d. 
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began to gather momentum in October, 1983.111 In response to the 
growing public concern over the chemical warfare agent testing, the 
Cambridge Commissioner of Health and Hospitals adopted a regu-
lation that would prohibit continued research with these agents 
pending completion and review of two reports being prepared on the 
issue. ll2 ADL promptly brought an action against the City in the 
Superior Court to enjoin the City's enforcement of the Commission-
er's regulation. The court granted a preliminary injunction.113 The 
City's efforts to regulate for health and safety were thus unsuccessful 
in the early legal stages. 
While legal proceedings continued, the Cambridge Scientific Ad-
visory Committee (SAC) met between April and September 1984 to 
consider the issue.114 In addition, an independent environmental con-
sulting firm hired by the City prepared its report on the "Community 
Risks From Experiments With Chemical Warfare Agents at Arthur 
D. Little."116 The consulting firm scientifically analyzed the potential 
public dangers of chemical warfare agent experimentation at ADL.116 
Their report did not characterize the hazards as either acceptable or 
unacceptable.l17 A senior consultant did, however, conclude in an 
affidavit submitted to the court that the "accidental or intentional 
release of nerve gas to the environment is very unlikely but not 
impossible. "118 
111 For a chronology of the events prior to the ADL litigation, see SAC Report, supra note 
11, at Appendix B. 
112 A Cambridge Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) was created by the City Council. Its 
members were appointed by the City Manager. The responsibility of SAC was 
to consider whether research or other use of toxic chemicals at present or in the 
future in Cambridge may have substantial risk for the public health and safety within 
the city. A specific responsibility of the committee shall be to consider whether the 
research on testing of nerve agents at Arthur D. Little Company may have a 
substantial risk for the public health in Cambridge. 
SAC Report, supra note 11, at 1. 
113 ADL, 395 Mass. at 538, 481 N.E.2d at 444. 
114 SAC Report, supra note 11, at 1. The SAC consisted of sixteen members, predominantly 
Cambridge residents, who represent such varied disciplines as chemistry, physics, pharma-
cology, public health, environmental policy, architecture, and public interest advocacy. [d. at 
A-I. 
115 TRC Environmental Consultants, Inc. Report to the City of Cambridge (June 5, 1984) 
(available from the Cambridge Commissioner of Health & Hospitals) [hereinafter TRC Re-
port]. 
116 [d. at 1. 
117 The consulting firm explained its decision not to characterize the hazard: "[p]erspective 
or what is acceptable involves comparison with other risks people are exposed to as well as 
consideration of other factors such as whether the risks are voluntary or involuntary and what 
benefits accompany the risk. " [d. at 1. 
118 [d. at Appendix-9. 
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The SAC Report issued on September 15, 1984 reached the same 
conclusion. The Committee found that ADL's use of the chemical 
agents was "inappropriate" and that the risks involved in such re-
search were "unacceptable"119 considering the laboratory's location 
within the densely populated City of Cambridge. 120 Following the 
submission of these two reports, the Commissioner of Health & 
Hospitals issued a second regulation and order reaffirming the City's 
prohibition of ADL's chemical agent research. 121 
Both sides continued their legal struggle to test the validity of the 
Cambridge regulation. The issue of whether the municipality had 
the power to prohibit the chemical warfare agent testing was ulti-
mately brought before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. 122 
119 In its conclusion on the ADL activity, the SAC stated: 
[Tlhat an accident involving release of chemical warfare agent into the community is 
unlikely, but not impossible. In the event of such a release, members of the general 
public might be located within range of potentially lethal levels of chemical warfare 
agent. The SAC feels that the benefits of research with these chemical warfare agents 
do not justify lethal risks to any individual. For this reason, the SAC believes that 
storage and testing of chemical warfare agents iii the quantities and concentrations 
used by ADL within the densely populated City of Cambridge is inappropriate. In 
addition, the majority of members of the SAC judge the risks associated with any 
such work unacceptable. 
SAC Report, supra note 11, at 14. Both the SAC and TRC reports studied the effects of the 
release of these agents into the environment. The effects were calculated in terms of "the 
type and quantity of nerve agent released, the form of the release and the weather conditions." 
Both reports found that the following groups of people "lie within the range of greatest risk" 
in the event of a release: 
(1) ADL employees in the immediate lab area; 
(2) patrons of the motel, restaurant, disco and bowling alley located within 600 feet of ADL; 
(3) motorists and pedestrians passing along Route 2 within 80 feet of ADL; 
(4) people playing on the fields located across Route 2 within 650 feet of ADL; 
(5) the residential neighborhoods within 650 feet of ADL; and 
(6) the curious who might be attracted to a fire or accident. 
[d. at 9. 
120 According to the 1980 U.S. Census, the City of Cambridge has a popUlation density of 
15,130 per square mile. This is a relatively high figure as compared to other Massachusetts 
communities. For example, the least populous, Belchertown, has a density of 452 per square 
mile, while the most populous, Somerville, has a density of 19,839 per square mile. Memoran-
dum of Decision on the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, February 26, 1985, 
Superior Court, No. 84-1529 at 5. 
121 The second regulation was the same as the first except for the reference to awaiting 
completion of the scientific reports. ADL, 395 Mass. at 538, n.2, 481 N.E.2d at 444, n.2. 
122 After the Commissioner issued a second regulation and order reaffirming the chemical 
agent ban, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the suit originally filed 
by ADL to test the regulation's validity. Judgment was entered on behalf of the Commissioner 
on February 27, 1985, declaring the regulation valid and enforceable. ADL then filed a notice 
of appeal as well as a motion for a stay pending appeal. The stay was denied by the lower 
court, then granted on March 15, 1985 by a single justice of the Appeals Court. The Commis-
sioner then filed a petition for relief from the stay with a justice of the Supreme Judicial Court 
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One of the main points upon which the decision turned was whether 
any federal regulatory scheme existed which would preempt the 
City's action. l23 The Court found none. l24 
IV. EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEME FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE 
AGENTS 
In its opinion on the preemption issue, the Massachusetts court 
studied possible avenues of federal control over chemical warfare 
agents. The court's inquiry began at the highest level of federal 
authority, the Constitution, then turned to an examination of federal 
legislative enactments regarding these agents. Finally, the court 
considered the possibility of administrative control in this area. 125 
At each stage, the court concluded that the federal regulatory 
scheme did not have preemptive effect over the City's regulation of 
chemical warfare agent research. 126 
A. Preemption at the Constitutional Level 
The Constitution grants plenary powers over war and defense to 
the federal government. It provides Congress with the power to 
"provide for the common Defence,"127 "[t]o raise and support Ar-
mies,"I28 "[t]o provide and maintain a NavY,"I29 "[t]o make Rules for 
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces"l30 and 
grants Congress the power "[t]o declare War."131 These provisions 
confer explicit constitutional authority to the federal government 
over all national defense matters.132 That does not mean, however, 
that "every regulation which has some incidental effect on a defense 
program is invalid under the supremacy clause. "133 
(SJC) who reserved and reported to the full bench. Both the issue of a stay and the appeal 
on the merits were heard by the SJC on August 1, 1985. They affinned the superior court's 
judgment declaring the regulation valid and enforceable. The SJC also vacated the stay 
granted in the appeals court. [d. at 539-40, 481 N.E.2d at 444-45. 
123 ADL also challenged the regulation on the grounds that it was procedurally inadequate, 
it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious and it violated the contract clause of the United 
States Constitution. [d. at 537, 481 N.E.2d at 443. 
124 [d. at 550, 481 N.E.2d at 45I. 
125 [d. at 546-52, 481 N.E.2d at 449-52. 
126 [d. 
127 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
128 [d. at cl. 12. 
129 [d. at cl. 13. 
130 [d. at cl. 14. 
131 [d. at cl. II. 
132 ADL, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449. 
133 [d. 
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The courts must examine the underlying purpose of a particular 
state or local enactment. If the local regulation has nothing more 
than a "'speculative and indirect impact'l34 on the national defense," 
then it is not preempted. 135 The Massachusetts court found that local 
regulation of chemical warfare agents did not impermissibly interfere 
with an essential element of a key national defense program. 136 The 
Department of Defense is still free to continue its chemical warfare 
program elsewhere. 137 A local regulation of this type would thus not 
conflict with the constitutional grant of war and defense powers to 
the federal government. 138 The state or locality is merely exercising 
its presumptively valid police powers in enacting a bona fide public 
health regulation. As stated by the trial court in ADL, "[t]he issue 
in this case is whether Cambridge may prohibit testing of toxic 
chemicals within its boundaries, not whether it may alter federal 
military policy decisions. "139 
It would be an entirely different question if a community were to 
regulate such military policy decisions. Courts generally have not 
looked favorably on private suits that raise substantive issues re-
garding the national defense or national security.140 Rather, these 
questions "lie within that narrow band of matters wholly committed 
to official discretion both because of the delicate security issues they 
raise and the constitutional delegation of those concerns to the po-
litical departments of our government. "141 In sum, "the courts are 
not the proper forum for debate on national security and defense 
issues. "142 
Therefore, unless there is a direct impact on military policy deci-
sions, local regulations covering chemical warfare agent testing that 
are designed to protect the public health and safety are valid. These 
134 [d., quoting, DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355.(fact that aliens are subject of state statute does 
not render it "per se preempted by exclusive [fjederal control over immigration under Con-
stitutional allocation of powers"). 
136 ADL, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449. 
136 [d. 
137 [d. 
138 [d. 
139 Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 9. 
140 Concerned About Trident v. Schlesinger, 400 F. Supp. 454, 482 (D.D.C. 1975), affirmed 
in part and reversed in part sub nom., Concerned About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (private suit challenging Trident submarine weapons program); see also, 
McQueary v. Laird, 449 F.2d 608 (loth Cir. 1971) (private suit challenging storage of toxic 
chemicals at federal arsenal); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Army 
private sought to enjoin Secretary of Defense from sending him to Vietnam). 
141 Concerned About Trident, 400 F. Supp. at 482. 
142 [d. 
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laws will not be preempted by the constitutional grant of war and 
defense powers to the federal government. 143 
B. Preemption at the Legislative Level 
Local regulations prohibiting chemical warfare agent testing may 
be preempted by existing federal legislation. The court in ADL 
examined federal statutes that authorize and regulate chemical war-
fare research,144 and gave cursory treatment to the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TOSCA).145 Applying the three categories of standard 
preemption analysis-federal occupation of the field,146 actual con-
flict, 147 and obstacle to accomplishment of congressional goalsl48-the 
court found that there was no federal legislative preemption of the 
City's ban on chemical warfare agent research. 
1. Statutes Authorizing and Restricting Chemical Warfare Agent 
Research 
The court found that neither the general military procurement 
statute149 nor legislation limiting the DOD's chemical and biological 
warfare program150 met the three bases for exercise of supremacy 
clause authority. The former authorizes the DOD "to acquire prop-
erty and services . . . in the most timely, economic, and efficient 
manner . . . by any kind of contract . . . that will promote the 
interest of the United States."151 The statute further authorizes "the 
Secretary of Defense ... [to] engage in basic and applied research 
projects that are necessary to the responsibilities of the Department 
of Defense in the field of basic and applied research and development 
and that relate to weapons systems and other military needs. "152 
143 ADL, 395 Mass. at 547, 481 N.E.2d at 449. 
144 Id. at 548-51, 481 N.E.2d at 450-52. 
145Id. at 548, n.11, 481 N.E.2d at 450, n.11; Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601-2629 (1976). For a thorough discussion of TOSCA see Gaynor, The Toxic Substances 
Control Act: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VAND. L. REV. 1149 (1977); The Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976: An Introductory Background and Analysis, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 
(1977). 
146 See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text. 
149 10 U.S. C. §§ 2301-2400 (1982) (generally controlling the authority of Secretary of Defense 
to contract for defense purposes). 
150 50 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1521 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
151 10 U.S.C. § 2301(a)(I) (1982). 
152 10 U.S.C. § 2358 (1982), quoted in, ADL, 395 Mass. at 549, 481 N.E.2d at 450. 
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The Service, Supply, and Procurement statute153 is essentially per-
missive in nature. It encourages cost-efficient research projects, but 
does not mandate a chemical warfare agent development program 
as a national objective. 1M 
In addition, the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program 
statute155 that does refer to "research, development, test[ing], and 
evaluation of all lethal and nonlethal chemical and biological agents" 
by the DOD, places limits and restrictions on these efforts. For 
example, the statute requires an annual report to Congress from the 
Secretary of Defense detailing the research conducted during the 
preceding year on any lethal or nonlethal agents. 156 The law prohibits 
the expenditure of funds for the transportation, open air testing, or 
disposal of chemical warfare agents unless certain procedures are 
followed. For example, the Surgeon General is required to review 
potential public health hazards posed by such activities. 157 The law 
also prohibits the expenditure of funds "for the procurement of 
delivery systems specifically designed to disseminate lethal chemical 
or ... biological warfare agents," unless the President certifies "that 
such procurement is essential to the safety and security of the United 
States. "158 The statute further prohibits, except in emergency situ-
ations, the disposal of chemical warfare agents unless they have first 
been detoxified. 159 There also are regulations for any chemical war-
fare agent tests or experiments with human subjects. 160 
These two statutes set forth the parameters for the DOD's chem-
ical warfare program. The court in ADL found, however, that these 
statutes do not have preemptive effect over local health and safety 
regulations in the chemical warfare agent field. 161 Nowhere do these 
statutes indicate that Congress intended "to occupy the field" of 
chemical warfare agents to the exclusion of the states. 162 In fact, 
most of these statutory provisions apply to the Secretary of Defense 
and not to other parties such as independent contractors.l63 The 
163 10 u.s.c. §§ 2301-2400 (1982). 
154 Brief for the Defendant-Appellee at 22, Arthur D. Little, Inc. v. Commissioner of Health 
& Hospitals of Cambridge. 
156 50 U.S.C. §§ 1511-1521 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
156 [d. at § 1511. 
157 [d. at § 1512. 
168 [d. at § 1516. 
159 [d. at §§ 1517-1518. 
160 [d. at § 1520. 
161 ADL, 395 Mass. at 549-50, 481 N.E.2d at 450-51; See also, Brief for the Defendant-
Appellee at 21-22. 
162 ADL, 395 Mass. at 550, 481 N.E.2d at 451. 
163 [d. 
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court thus concluded that neither the Service, Supply, and Procure-
ment regulation nor the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program 
restricts a state's regulatory authority because there is insufficient 
congressional occupation of the field to warrant preemption. 164 
Moreover, local enactments would present no "conflict" with these 
statutes in the sense that "compliance with both federal and state 
regulations is a physical impossibility."165 Indeed, the DOD could 
simply move its research efforts to other locations or onto Army 
bases. Under the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to ex-
ercise exclusive authority for the "erection of Forts, Magazines, 
Arsenals, Dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings, "166 the military 
would be allowed to carryon its chemical warfare agent activities 
free from state or local regulations. 167 
Finally, local regulation of chemical warfare agents does not create 
"an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress"168 so as to frustrate the federal scheme. 
In fact, the court concludes that there is no federal scheme that 
promotes or encourages private research on toxic chemical agents. 169 
Therefore, since these statutes do not indicate a "clear and manifest 
purpose" of Congress to encourage only private chemical warfare 
agent research, there is no pervasive federal scheme that a local 
chemical warfare agent ban would frustrate. 170 
2. Toxic Substances Control Act (TaSCA) 
Congress has enacted a number of environmental protection stat-
utes that regulate the use and disposal of hazardous or toxic sub-
stances. Most of these are designed to combat the after-effects of 
chemicals that have already been released into the environment. 171 
TaSCA differs because it is intended to be a preventive measure; 
its goal is to prevent hazardous substances from ever entering the 
164ld. 
165ld., quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43 (1963). 
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 
167 McQueary, 449 F.2d at 612 ("In its proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government 
has traditionally exercised unfettered control with respect to internal management and op-
eration of federal military establishments."). 
168 Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. 
169 ADL, 395 Mass. at 550, 481 N.E.2d at 451. 
170 Id. 
171 The Toxic Substances Control Act: Overview and Evaluation, A Report by the Toxic 
Substances Control Act Policy Research Project, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, 
Number 50, at 15 (1982). 
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environment. 172 In this respect, it could possibly preempt local reg-
ulations of chemical warfare agent testing. 
TOSCA is a broad review and permit statute that is designed to 
fill existing gaps in federal environmental legislation. 173 TOSCA au-
thorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to conduct a 
premarketing review of new chemicals174 and require testing of all 
existing chemicals175 to determine whether they "present an unrea-
sonable risk of injury to health or the environment. "176 If the EPA 
concludes that the chemical substance presents an unreasonable risk 
to the public, then the agency must issue regulations pursuant to 
TOSCA to protect the public against such risk. l77 
By including a section on preemption, Congress attempted to 
reconcile TOSCA's broad scope with the interests of state and local 
governments in toxic substances regulation. 178 While TOSCA gives 
the EPA general authority to insure public health and safety through 
toxic chemical regulation, it does not preclude states and localities 
from acting, toO.179 The statute explicitly permits state and local 
regulation of toxic chemical substances within their jurisdiction. 180 
The Act provides, however, two significant exceptions to the gen-
eral standard of no preemption. First, if the EPA Administrator has 
issued a testing rule for a chemical substance or mixture under 
section 2603, then no state or political subdivision may require test-
ing of that chemical for similar purposes. 181 Second, if the EPA 
Administrator issues a rule or order under section 2604 (premanu-
facturing and processing notices) or section 2605 (regulation of haz-
ardous chemical substances and mixtures), no state or local govern-
ment may impose a requirement for that chemical that is designed 
to protect against the same risk. 182 Thus, in these two instances the 
local regulation would be preempted. The disposal requirements of 
section 2605(a)(6) are expressly excepted from such preemption. 183 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 157; see also, S. Rep. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4491. 
174 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1976). 
175Id. § 2603. 
176Id. § 2605(a). 
177Id. 
178 Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 10-11. 
179Id. 
180 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(I) (1976) ("[N]othing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any 
State or political subdivision of a State to establish or continue in effect regulation of any 
chemical substance, mixture, or article containing a chemical substance or mixture."). 
181Id. § 2617(a)(2)(A). 
182 Id. § 2617(a)(2)(B). 
183 Id. 
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The state or local requirement will not be preempted, however, if 
it is identical to the federal Administrator's requirement,l84 if it is 
adopted under the authority of another federal law, 185 or if it prohib-
its the use of the substance in that state or locality. 186 TOSCA itself 
thus provides a method for local regulations to escape the statute's 
limited preemptive effect. 
Moreover, in the unlikely event that a state or local government's 
enactment is preempted by TOSCA, the locality may apply for an 
exemption from federal preemption under section 2617(b). The EPA 
Administrator may grant the exemption if compliance with the state 
or local requirement would not be in violation of certain requirements 
prescribed under TOSCA,187 if the state or local requirement pro-
vides significantly greater protection than exists under the Act, 188 
and if it does not unduly burden interstate commerce. 189 Reading 
the preemption section of TOSCA as a whole, it is clear that Con-
gress intended to allow state and local governments to provide some 
regulation for toxic chemical substances. 19o Local regulations are 
allowed under TOSCA, and these may go so far as to ban the use of 
a particular substance or mixture within the locality even when the 
EPA Administrator has already prescribed a rule for that sub-
stance. 191 
Thus, if the EPA has not enacted rules for a chemical substance, 
then the state or local government may regulate it without fear of 
preemption under TOSCA. Even if the EPA has enacted rules for a 
chemical, then the state or local government may still regulate it 
pursuant to another federal law or prohibit the use of such substance 
without being preempted. In effect, TOSCA has little preemptive 
power unless the EPA Administrator has prescribed rules or orders 
for the chemical at issue. The absence of preemption is particularly 
evident with chemical warfare agents because there is no "federal 
administrative action by which preemption is 'triggered."'192 A 10-
184 [d. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(i). 
185 [d. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
186 [d. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(iii) ("other than its use in the manufacture or processing of other 
substances or mixtures"). 
187 [d. § 2617(b)(I). 
188 [d. § 2617(b)(2)(A). 
189 [d. § 2617(b)(2)(B). 
190 S. Rep. No. 698, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4491,4517; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1679, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 94-95, reprinted in 1976 
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4539, 4579-80. 
191 15 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2)(B)(iii) (1976). 
192 See SED, Inc. V. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979, 987 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
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cality can thus regulate and ban the testing of chemical warfare 
agents within its jurisdiction and TOSCA does not preempt the 
action since it does not cover chemical warfare agents. 193 
C. Preemption at the Administrative Level 
While current environmental statutes do not preempt local regu-
lations of chemical warfare agents, the fact that these agents are 
part of the government's military weapons development program 
may impute to them the authority of federal law. 194 The Department 
of the Army's environmental protection regulations195 include a sub-
part on specific rules for chemical warfare agents. 1OO These regula-
tions have the force of federal law because they were promulgated 
by the Secretary of the Army acting under statutory authority. 197 
As such they could preempt local regulations. 
The Army regulations, however, have a limited applicability. 198 
They only apply to military installationsl99 and to contractor 
activities200 located on property under the Department of the Army's 
jurisdiction. 201 Activities by private contractors on private land 
would thus fall outside the Army's regulatory scheme. 
Even if the Army's environmental authority extended to private 
contractors' activities, the Army regulations would not present an 
actual conflict with local controls of chemical warfare agents. Rather, 
these regulations reveal a general intent to permit local toxic sub-
stances regulation: 
193 SAC Report, supra note 11, at 15; see also, Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 
103, at 10. 
194 But ADL's status as a DOD contractor does not permit it, or the DOD, "to contract ... 
out of local health and safety requirements." ADL, 395 Mass. at 552, 481 N.E.2d at 452. A 
contract to which the federal government is a party does not constitute federal law for 
supremacy clause purposes. Id. 
Similarly, a claim of derivative sovereign immunity by a private government contractor 
under Pratt v. Hercules, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 773 (D. Utah 1982) applies as a defense to an 
unconsented suit and not in a situation of local government regulation. Memorandum on 
Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 9. 
195 32 C.F.R. §§ 650.1-650.238 (1984). 
196 Id. § 650.141. 
197 10 U.S.C. § 3012(g) (1982); see also, Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 
14. 
198 32 C.F.R. § 650.2 (1984). 
199 Id. § 650.2(a) (Army Reserve installations); Id. § 650.2(b) (National Guard installations); 
Id. § 650.2(c) (Army installations). 
200 Id. § 650.2(d). 
201Id. 
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[t]he Department of the Army will comply with environmental 
quality policies and procedures specified in this regulation and 
those standards established by the applicable Federal, state, 
interstate, or local authority for the control of hazardous and 
toxic materials and substances. 202 
In addition, the Army's policy is to "program and budget sufficient 
resources for the effective management and environmental control 
of . . . hazardous chemical stocks . . . and chemical agents . . . in 
consonance with any other applicable Federal, State, or local objec-
tives. "203 These Army regulations explicitly acknowledge the pres-
ence of local standards for the control of chemical warfare agents. 
Despite its recognition of possible local action regarding toxic 
chemicals, the Department of the Army apparently does not go so 
far as to accommodate a local prohibition of these agents. Rather, 
the Army retains regulatory authority for purposes of national de-
fense. Although "leadership in environmental pollution abatement 
and enhancement of the environment" are the stated policies of the 
DOD and its agencies, these must be attained "consistent with the 
security interests of the Nation."204 There is therefore an implicit 
tension, within the Army's own regulations, between the necessity 
of environmental protection and the interests of national defense. 205 
While the Army's goal is to minimize health hazards and environ-
mental damage,206 there are self-imposed limits on the achievement 
of this objective. The Army will control its use of toxic and/or haz-
ardous materials but only "to the extent practicable. "207 Thus, in 
light of the fact that Congress funds such research, the Army reg-
ulations seem to deny the applicability of a local ban on chemical 
warfare agents. 208 
2JYI. [d. § 650.124(b). 
003 [d. § 650.124(e). Other policies of the Department of the Army include: conforming to 
the provisions of FIFRA, [d. § 650.124(f); conforming with Atomic Energy Act standards 
and guidelines, [d. § 650.124(i); prohibiting the disposal of chemical warfare agents "directly 
into the air, water, or land environment in a manner hazardous to man or animals or if it will 
cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment," [d. § 650.124(j); conforming with 
federal regulations for dumping of materials into ocean waters, [d. § 650.124(k). 
20( [d. § 650.5(a)(2). Similarly, TaSCA explicitly recognizes that national defense consider-
ations may predominate local, state, or federal regulations of toxic substances. The Act 
provides for a "[n]ational defense waiver" in just those cases: "[t]he Administrator shall waive 
compliance with any provision of this chapter upon a request and determination by the 
President that the requested waiver is necessary in the interest of national defense." 15 
U.S.C. § 2621 (1976). 
Z05 32 C.F.R. § 650.5(d) (1984). 
206 [d. § 650.122. 
2Il7 [d. § 650.122(b). 
208 But local prohibitions of the use of chemical warfare agents may be accommodated by 
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Further support for this position is evident from the control over 
chemical agents retained by the Army. The regulations state that 
the Department of the Army will "provide [a] single . . . contact 
point for all chemical warfare activities including demilitarization 
and disposal. "209 They also state that "compliance with DA [Depart-
ment of Army] and other Federal regulations on the disposal of 
chemical agents and munitions" will be ensured. 210 Finally, the sec-
tion on "Chemical warfare agents"211 mandates that "[t]he handling, 
use, and disposal of chemical warfare agents . . . will be in accor-
dance with Army regulations;"212 and the Army has set out its spe-
cific "Safety Program for Chemical Agents and Associated Weapon 
Systems. "213 The Department of the Army thus extensively regu-
lates the field of chemical warfare agents. These regulations acknowl-
edge concurrent state and local environmental interests but also 
retain the Army's control over certain aspects of chemical warfare 
agents. Were Congress explicitly to authorize the DOD and its agen-
cies to control the entire field, then these regulations would probably 
preempt any local enactments. Without a specific congressional del-
egation of authority to do so, however, the DOD cannot administra-
tively preempt local health and safety requirements. 214 
V. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
There is currently no area of federal authority-constitutional, 
legislative, or administrative-that will preempt a local ban on chem-
ical warfare agent testing, storage, transportation, and disposal. 215 
This regulatory vacuum enabled one community, the City of Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, to prohibit chemical warfare agents within 
its borders.216 The state's highest court upheld the ban finding no 
the Army regulations via TOSCA. The superior court decision in ADL pursued this line of 
analysis. Memorandum on Severed Issue, supra note 103, at 14. 
209 32 C.F.R. § 650. 125(a)(2)(ii) (1984). 
210ld. § 650.125(b)(3). 
211 ld. § 650.141. 
2121d. § 650.141(a). 
213 Safety Program for Chemical Agents and Associated Weapon Systems A.R. 385-61 
(1972). This safety program also acknowledges the tension between environmental protection 
and national defense interests. While "[tJhe goal ... will be to assure that all lethal and 
selected incapacitating chemical agents and their associated chemical weapon systems incor-
porate the maximum safety," this must be done "consistent with operational requirements." 
ld. 385-61(3). 
214 See ADL, 395 Mass. at 548-52,481 N.E.2d at 450-52. 
2151d. at 546-52, 481 N.E.2d at 448-52. 
216 For the text of the regulation see id. at 538, n.2, 481 N.E.2d at 444, n.2. 
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"congressional action which clearly conflicts with the regulation at 
issue," nor any "congressional intent to occupy the field."217 In the 
absence of a federal regulatory scheme to preempt their actions, 
state and local governments may step in to fill the gaps. 
Due to the absence of clear federal control over all chemical war-
fare agent research regulation, and the power of localities to regulate 
for health and safety pursuant to their police powers, other local 
regulatory bans are possible. While Cambridge is the only location 
to address this issue directly, other municipalities may have to do 
so as Congress increases the funding for DOD programs to develop 
new chemical weapons and to detoxify old ones. 218 As an ADL vice 
president prophesied, "[t]hings that start in Cambridge ... have a 
way of happening elsewhere."219 
The chemical warfare agent field is an example of the collision of 
federal and local interests. Although legal, a ban on these agents 
will not solve the problem. These bans will not advance national 
defense interests associated with new chemical weapons develop-
ment or old chemical weapons detoxification. The growing congres-
sional and administrative support for chemical warfare agent re-
search indicates the national interest in this area. 220 One local ban 
could encourage similar action by other cities and towns, thereby 
thwarting the DOD's chemical warfare research program. 221 
In case of a ban, the Army has the alternative of conducting the 
toxic chemical experiments on its military bases. There it would be 
relatively free from local regulations. 222 On federal land, the Army 
could conduct chemical warfare agent testing "in accordance with 
Army regulations. "223 By picking its own sites, the Army could 
reduce local interference with chemical warfare agent research and 
217Id. at 551, 481 N.E.2d at 451. 
218 See supra note 9. 
219 See supra note 5, at F4, col. 4. 
220 See supra note 9. 
221 This possibility concerned the court in Warren County v. State of North Carolina, which 
held void an ordinance that prohibits disposal of PCBs in Warren County as conflicting with 
TOSCA. 528 F. Supp. 276,290 (E.D. N.C. 1981). The Court felt that if they were "to approve 
this ordinance, no doubt the other ninety-nine counties in North Carolina would quickly enact 
identical bans." Id.; But see SED, 519 F. Supp. at 991 (court upheld local ban on PCB disposal 
under § 2617(a)(2)(B)(ii) of TOSCA). 
For an attempt to reconcile the conflicting judicial interpretations of TOSCA with respect 
to PCB disposal, see Andreen, Defusing the "Not in My Back Yard" Syndrome: An Approach 
to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facil-
ities, 63 N.C. L. REV. 811 (1985). 
222 McQueary, 449 F.2d at 612. 
223 32 C.F.R. § 650. 141(a) (1984). 
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circumvent any nearby locality's concerns about public health and 
safety. Relocation of chemical warfare agent research to Army bases 
also does not address regulation of the agents' transportation to and 
from the federal land. Nor does the relocation solution consider the 
cost of conducting research on Army bases that was previously done 
by private contractors. 
Thus, in the case of a ban, local interests are preeminent. On the 
other hand, the relocation of all chemical research efforts to federal 
land allows national interests to take precedence. In either situation, 
one of the two concerns-local or national-will lose. 
While the problem may never arise again, in the only case to date 
dealing with the issue a local prohibition of chemical warfare agent 
research was upheld.224 In that case, the court found no federal 
authority to preempt the local regulation. An alternative to local 
prohibitions should be tried because chemical warfare agents will be 
tested in this country in the future,225 particularly as the congres-
sional mandate to detoxify the obsolete weapons stockpiles takes 
effect.226 A move to Army bases, free from local regulation, could 
still harm nearby populations if there were an accident. 227 Therefore, 
a cooperative regulatory scheme should be instituted wherein "the 
federal government establishes the primary regulatory framework 
and the states merely implement and enforce federal policy."228 
While it is beyond the scope of this article to draft remedial 
legislation, the current regulatory scheme offers ideas and possible 
solutions. Existing federal toxic substances legislation, together with 
the DOD's chemical warfare agent safety programs, and traditional 
local health and safety regulations, could effectively close the regu-
latory gap in the chemical warfare agent field. 
A. Chemical Warfare Agents Under TOSCA 
First of all, the EPA Administrator may act to bring chemical 
warfare agents within the ambit of TOSCA.229 Promulgating a rule 
or order with respect to these agents would not necessarily prevent 
224 ADL, 395 Mass. 535, 481 N.E.2d 441. 
225 See supra note 9. 
226 Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-145, 99 Stat. 583 
(1986). 
227 See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. 
228 Foote, supra note 51, at 1430 nA. Cooperative federalism regards federal and state 
governments as mutually complementary parts of a single governmental mechanism. Note, 
supra note 80, at 623 n.1. 
229 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1976). 
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a local prohibition of such substances.23o In order to prevent the 
possibility of a chain reaction of a local ban, then withdrawal of 
chemical warfare agent testing to military bases, the EPA should 
be empowered to review local chemical warfare agent regulations to 
determine whether or not they are preempted.231 A ban could still 
be allowed if it were found that unique local conditions so warranted. 
For example, a densely populated area may not be an appropriate 
location for chemical warfare agent testing. 
Under TOSCA, the EPA may also cooperate with other federal 
agencies "for the purpose of achieving the maximum enforcement 
... while imposing the least burdens of duplicative requirements."232 
This option of discretionary cooperation could preserve the use of 
the DOD regulations in addition to any EPA rulings.233 Such coop-
eration would produce an umbrella of federal action that would cover 
chemical warfare agent activities, even in the absence of an explicit 
congressional enactment as to the national objective concerning the 
development of chemical warfare agents. 
B. Local Safety and Health Enactments 
Local safety and health requirements could supplement the EPA 
and DOD regulatory programs. The Department of Health and Hos-
pitals for the City of Boston recently reviewed a proposed study 
involving small quantities of the nerve agent Soman-GD. The study 
discussed some of the forms that local regulations may take.234 For 
example, the local Department of Health may retain final review and 
approval of any chemical warfare agent testing proposals;235 any 
shipment of these agents may only be made with an authorization 
certificate from the Department of Health;236 and the quantities of 
230 Id. § 2617(2)(B)(iii). 
231 The model for these non-preemption determinations is the Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation Act and the power of the Department of Transportation to make findings thereunder. 
For an example of a non-preemption determination see 50 Fed. Reg. 37308 (September 12, 
1985). 
232 15 U.S.C. § 2608(d) (1976). 
233 "Preemption of state regulations by federal agencies has the potential to supplement the 
increasingly ineffective checks on state regulations that harm national interests available . . . 
through judicial interpretation of typically ambiguous congressional expressions of intent 
concerning preemption." Pierce, supra note 1, at 640-41. 
234 Proposed Soman Study: Findings and Orders, City of Boston Department of Health and 
Hospitals, July 26, 1985 (available from the City of Boston Department of Health and Hos-
pitals). 
236 Id. at 2. 
236 Id. 
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chemical warfare agents kept on site may be limited.237 In addition, 
the City of Cambridge SAC recommended public hearings any time 
these agents were to be used.238 These types of local regulations, in 
tandem with federal regulations, could protect the public without 
resorting to the drastic measure of a complete prohibition of chemical 
warfare agent testing, storage, transportation, or disposal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The existence of out-of-date chemical weapons is a fact. Some of 
these are physically deteriorating, which raises the possibility of 
chemical leaks. Eventually, these weapons will be detoxified, a pro-
cess which will involve testing, storage, transportation, and disposal 
of hazardous substances. 
The production of new chemical weapons is a real possibility. 
Funding for their development has increased during the current 
Administration. Continuation or acceleration of these activities will 
also involve testing, storage, transportation, and disposal of hazard-
ous substances. 
Both national and local interests are involved in these two en-
deavors. In light of the current judicial solicitude for local concerns, 
and the absence of clear federal intent to control the field, local 
regulation will predominate. The only court to address the question 
to date concluded that the existing federal regulatory scheme for 
chemical warfare agents does not preempt a local ban on their use. 
There is thus no federal authority that preempts state or local 
regulation of chemical warfare agents. A national response in this 
area is impossible if the states retain authority that cannot be 
preempted. A national solution to the conflicting interests raised 
over the detoxification and production of these chemical warfare 
agents requires thorough and precise federal action to restrain the 
unimpeded effect of state and local regulation. 
237Id. 
288 See supra note 11, at 4. 
